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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis proposes an architecture for the coordination of global space 
capabilities in a joint force commander’s theater of operations.  The current 
architecture for space capabilities coordination in a geographic area of 
operations is not standardized, and is instead left up to each theater to develop 
independently.  As dependence on space capabilities proliferates to the lowest 
levels of operations, while the capabilities and products provided by space 
systems becomes increasingly complex, ad hoc relationships are no longer 
sufficient.  Purely because of physics, assets on orbit are global, rather than 
theater, in nature, and require a global level of control.  The interaction of a 
unified global controlling organization with disparate theater coordination 
constructs results in confusion, inefficiency, and potentially lost opportunities to 
influence or support operations.  The standardization of space coordination 
across theaters will ensure that similarly trained and operating organizations are 
able to interact within their theater, across theaters, and up to the space 
command and control organization.  This thesis proposes the establishment of a 
theater space coordination cell on the staff of the joint force commander in order 
to provide theater-wide space capabilities coordination and reach-back to U.S.-
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I. SPACE COORDINATION BACKGROUND  
The 21st century American military has witnessed a significant change in 
how it takes advantage of National Security Space capabilities.  Campaigns such 
as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) provided tactical users at increasingly lower echelons the 
opportunity to exploit capabilities which had historically been viewed as strategic 
in nature.  This change began in 1991 when the capabilities of GPS and detailed 
ISR products were made widely available, and has accelerated rapidly during the 
conduct of OEF and OIF.  However, despite the increase in space capabilities 
available to “warfighters,” the short term solutions implemented for OEF and OIF 
will not serve as a perfect model for future conflicts.   
With the increase in utility of space support to the “warfighter,” warriors are 
beginning to examine in more detail the coordination relationships that allow this 
support to happen.  A very common example of this utility is in the form of the 
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), an air to surface munition guided by the 
Global Positioning System (GPS).  This munition, which is enabled by the space 
capabilities inherent to the GPS constellation, provides a tactical user a very 
precise, lethal effect.1  Another example is the proliferation of tactical satellite 
communications, which have proven to be a lifesaving capability during the day-
to-day operations in the mountains of southeast Afghanistan.2  One can assume 
that the existing trend of pushing greater space capabilities into the hands of 
tactical end users will continue.  Despite this trend, providing an increasing 
amount of capabilities to an increasing number of tactical end users, the problem 
of properly coordinating these capabilities begins to introduce friction and 
inefficiency into the system. 
                                            
1 Jane’s Information Group.  Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, “Joint Direct Attack Munition 
(JDAM): GBU-31, GBU-32, GBU-35, GBU-38,” updated 31 July 2006, www.janes.com, Accessed 
9 August 2006. 
2 Christian Lowe, “Nowhere to Hide,” Marine Corps Times, May 22, 2006. 
2 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the current theater space 
coordination architecture that exists in the Central Command (CENTCOM) 
theater and identify its positive and negative aspects.  Additionally, the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force have each created initiatives to change or enhance the 
future of theater space coordination.  This thesis will review each of those 
initiatives and will identify the positive and negative aspects of these 
architectures.  The goal of this research is to make a case for a more 
standardized architecture for theater space coordination to ensure that the 
customer is receiving the necessary “two cups of space”. 
The first step in this process is to identify the most up to date military 
doctrine that guides the use of space capabilities.  Military doctrine should flow 
from the highest authority to the lowest and from the most general concept to the 
most specific.  In this study, the highest authority would be Joint Publication (JP) 
3-14 (Joint Doctrine for Space Operations), from which service specific doctrine 
should flow.  Understanding the terminology and concepts that form the 
foundation for exploiting space capabilities is foundational to establishing an 
effective theater coordination architecture.  Unfortunately, the current doctrine is 
not consistent in terminology (as discussed in detail in Chapter II) and some 
necessary publications are either outdated or nonexistent.  For example, JP 3-14 
was last published on August 9, 2002, preceding the reorganization of U.S. 
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and U.S. Space Command in October 
2002.  Since that reorganization, JP 3-14 has become increasingly less relevant 
to the current state of affairs for conducting joint space operations.  The Navy 
and Marine Corps do not yet have published space operations related doctrine. 
The next step is to examine the application of joint and service doctrine 
that is supporting the CENTCOM theater of operations.  OEF began in November 
2001 and OIF began in March 2003.  Both conflicts have provided an opportunity 
for the military to exercise space operations doctrine.  In October 2005, 
USSTRATCOM initiated a study to examine the space coordination process that 
existed in the CENTCOM theater of operations.  The Joint Space Coordination 
Task Final Report, published in February 2006, provided an excellent snapshot 
3 
of the most current space capability coordination processes.  This report, 
prepared by Mr. Randy Hugenroth of Booz Allen Hamilton, outlined the basic 
architectures for space coordination that exist among the COCOMs, identified 
shortfalls of the various architectures, and provided some recommendations for 
ways to improve the current coordination relationships.  Reviewing the theater 
space coordination process currently implemented in the CENTCOM AOR allows 
for a simple transition into the next step in the process.  Like all developing 
concepts, the current space coordination architecture in CENTCOM is not perfect 
and has room for improvement.  While it is effective, it is certainly not optimized.     
The JSCT Report did identify that not all the services agree with the way 
that the concepts of SCA and the DIRSPACEFOR have been implemented.  For 
example, one of the conclusions of the JSCT Report pointed out that “the 
DIRSPACEFOR is solely an Air Force construct which should grow into the joint 
arena.”3  The problem is not so much that the Air Force created the 
DIRSPACEFOR, but rather that current joint doctrine does not provide for such a 
position anywhere in the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) organization.  Also, 
“the appointment of the commander exercising SCA (space coordinating 
authority) needs to be refined and detailed in joint doctrine.  Current practices 
vary from the JFC retaining SCA to the SCA being informally executed by 
headquarters staff elements.”  Air Force doctrine highly recommends that the 
COCOM delegate SCA to the air component commander.4  The other services, 
specifically the Army, are not in complete agreement that this is the correct 
solution.  Army doctrinal developments indicate that the air component 
commander might not be the best choice for the delegation of Space 
Coordinating Authority.5  This dynamic between the services shows that differing 
views exist and that a simple solution probably does not exist. 
                                            
3 Randy Hugenroth, “Joint Space Coordination Task Final Report,” (Omaha, NE: Booz Allen 
Hamilton, 28 Feb 2006): 2. 
4 Air Force Doctrine Document 2: Operations and Organization. 62. 
5 Army Theater Space Support in Joint Operations – Today, 4. 
4 
The third step is to examine the varying near-term proposals for 
enhancing or changing the current theater space coordination process, as well as 
programs which might drive future change in the status quo.  For instance, the 
Navy has initiated the Naval Space Campaign, which has as its operational goal 
to ensure that a deployed carrier strike group is fully integrated into the theater 
space coordination process, which the Navy discovered was not the case in the 
past.  Another example of a near-term proposal for theater space coordination is 
the Army Theater Space Support Concept.  This Army plan intends on integrating 
space expertise throughout the joint force land component in order to fully 
integrate space capabilities across multiple echelons, including tactical 
formations.  Examining these service specific proposals will create a better 
understanding of the direction the military intends to go in its ongoing 
development of theater space coordination. 
The final step is to examine various architecture solutions for theater 
space coordination.  The first solution is to simply maintain the status quo.  The 
second possible solution is the establishment of a Joint Functional Space 
Component Command within the regional combatant commander’s organization.  
The third solution is the establishment of a theater space coordination cell that is 
part of the Joint Force Commander’s staff.  Through examining the positive and 
negative aspects of these solutions, one can identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of each and determine which should be the preferred solution. 
Since the first Gulf War in 1990-91, warfighters have begun to make more 
and more requests for support from the space asset infrastructure.  Whether for 
more SATCOM bandwidth, more ISR products, or more enhanced GPS 
accuracy, the requirements that the warfighters have placed on the space assets 
have increased to a point that the military is creating new terms, doctrine, and 
organizations to meet the required increased demand.  The intent of these newly 
created constructs is to provide a mechanism for conducting the necessary 
coordination activities to ensure that all warfighter requirements are met by the 
space assets that provide them.   
5 
The lack of a joint vision for theater space coordination is detrimental to 
the long term development of each of the services’ particular programs.  The 
collective military space community cannot afford to waste its limited time and 
resources by failing to work together towards achieving the optimal solution for 
theater space coordination.  Ultimately, a future path for the development of 
theater space coordination will appear in the next few years.  How the military as 
a whole decides what that future path looks like is uncertain.  At some point, the 
services will have to agree on the appropriate organization and doctrine that is 
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II. SIGNIFICANT DEFINITIONS 
As joint and service doctrine develops, it is often the case that individual 
concepts are interpreted or developed in a service-specific manner, resulting in 
diverging interpretations of a single theme.  In order to properly bound the 
discussion ahead, concrete and common definitions must be laid out.  The 
priority for these definitions is given first to joint doctrine publications (such as 
Joint Publication 1-02), then to service doctrines (such as Air Force Doctrine 
Document 2-2), then to other authoritative publications or reports.  In some 
cases, official doctrine has not yet codified the organization or concept under 
discussion.  In those cases, the most current information was used to develop 
the definition. 
The chapter is broken down into two major sections: Organizations and 
Concepts.  The first section outlines the organizations which play a key role in 
the space coordination process, while the second section defines doctrinal or 
operational concepts. 
The definitions presented in this chapter summarize the key points of each 
organization or concept; for further detail, refer to the appendix. 
A. ORGANIZATIONS 
1. Joint Functional Component Command, Space and Global 
Strike  
On October 1, 2002, USSTRATCOM and U.S. Space Command merged 
to form a new unified command.  On Jan. 10, 2003, Change Two to the Unified 
Command plan assigned USSTRATCOM four major tasks which had been 
unassigned to a specific unified command.  In response to the merger with U.S. 
Space Command and the acceptance of new tasks, USSTRATCOM reorganized 
into four Joint Functional Component Commands and two functional 
components.6 
                                            
6 U.S. Strategic Command, “U.S. Strategic Command History,” 
http://www.stratcom.mil/about-ch.html, accessed May 2006. 
8 
The Commander, 8th Air Force was assigned as the Joint Functional 
Component Command, Space and Global Strike (JFCC SGS) in January 2005.  
The JFCC SGS is “responsible for integrating planning and command and control 
support for the rapid delivery of extended range, precision effects in support of 
theater or national objectives. [JFCC SGS] Also directs the deliberate planning 
and execution of assigned space operation missions.”7 
In July 2006, Commander USSTRATCOM signed an implementation 
directive disestablishing JFCC Space and Global Strike, and establishing the 
Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE).8  The 
Commander, 14th AF will be the commander of this new organization.9  The 
JFCC SPACE is scheduled to achieve IOC on 01 August 2006, with FOC in June 
2007, and will execute all space roles and responsibilities previously assigned to 
JFCC SGS.10 
2. Theater Air Control System  
The Theater Air Control System (TACS) is the mechanism for 
commanding and controlling theater air and space power. It 
consists of airborne and ground elements to conduct tailored C2 of 
air and space operations throughout the spectrum of conflict…As 
an organic US Air Force weapon system, the TACS remains under 
OPCON of the COMAFFOR.11 
The Theater Air Control System consists of multiple elements; its key 
command and control portion is the Air and Space Operations Center, described 
in the following section. 
3. Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) 
The AOC is the senior C2 element of the TACS and includes 
personnel and equipment of the necessary disciplines to ensure the 
effective conduct of air and space operations (e.g., 
                                            
7 U.S. Strategic Command, “Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global 
Strike (JFCC SGS)”, http://www.stratcom.mil/fact_sheets/fact_sgs.html, accessed May 2006. 
8 General James E. Cartwright, USMC, memorandum, 19 July 2006, Joint Functional 
Component Command for Space – Implementation Directive. 
9 General James E. Cartwright, USMC, memorandum, 19 July 2006, Appointment to 
Command: Joint Functional  Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE). 
10 General James E. Cartwright, USMC, memorandum, 19 July 2006, Joint Functional 
Component Command for Space – Implementation Directive. 
11 Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organization. 63. 
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communications, operations, intelligence, etc.). As the operations 
command center of the JFACC, it provides the capability to plan, 
task, execute, monitor, and assess the activities of assigned or 
attached forces.12  
4. FALCONER Air Operations Center  
The Falconer AOC is essentially an AOC which has been tailored to the 
needs of a specific theater or combatant commander.  It serves as the primary 
C2 element for the JFACC, as does the baseline AOC.  The significance of the 
Falconer AOC is that it can be shaped and scaled to meet specific needs, from a 
combatant commander level down to a sub-unified commander or joint task 
force.  The deployment or employment of its individual elements is based on 
customer need rather than inflexible organizational definition.13 
5.  Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) 
The JSpOC is the operational command and control (C2) center 
that provides Commander, JFCC SGS (CDR JFCC SGS), via the 
Commander, Joint Space Operations (CDRJSO), the capability to 
plan, task, direct, synchronize, and assess the activities of assigned 
and attached space forces (as well as those space forces made 
available for tasking)… CDR JFCC SGS executes OPCON of 
space forces via the JSpOC at Vandenberg AFB, CA.14 
As a Falconer AOC, the JSpOC has a very similar structure to a CFACC 
AOC.  It lacks a mobility division, and adds divisions specific to space functions 
(assured access, for example).  As an AOC, the JSpOC is charged with 
conducting both future planning and current operations.  Its Strategy Division 
conducts the planning function, while the Combat Operations Division develops 
and executes the Space Tasking Order (S-T-O).  The S-T-O, similar to an Air 
Tasking Order (ATO), tasks space forces over which the JSpOC has been 
assigned operational or tactical control. 
 
 
                                            
12 Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organization. 54. 
13 Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organization. 94. 
14 Air Force Operational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 2-3.4, Joint Space Operations 
Center (Draft), 20 January 2006. 
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6. Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) 
During Exercise Millennium Challenge ’02, Joint Forces Command 
(JFCOM) developed and tested the concept of the Standing Joint Force 
Headquarters (SJFHQ).  This is a full-time construct within a unified 
commander’s staff which is charged with the readiness to stand up as a Joint 
Task Force headquarters on short notice.  The concept is designed to prevent a 
staff which has never planned or operated together from being hastily assembled 
in a crisis situation.  Instead, the SJFHQ staff, comprised of smaller elements 
from each of the regional service component commanders, is always constituted 
and regularly exercises its functions. 
The Secretary of Defense has mandated that all unified commanders 
adopt the SJFHQ within their organizations; the specific form of implementation, 
however, has been left up to each commander to tailor to theater-specific needs.  
The individual services are restructuring their theater-level command and control 
organizations to align with the SJFHQ.  The U.S. Navy’s Maritime Headquarters 
and the U.S. Air Force’s War Fighting Headquarters are examples of this 
process.15 
7. War Fighting Headquarters (WFHQ) 
The US Air Force is establishing a new operational-level warfighting 
headquarters (WFHQs) to serve as the core of the US Air Force 
Service component headquarters to the respective unified 
combatant commands. These new WFHQs will assume many of 
the operational responsibilities of today’s MAJCOMs and NAFs. 
Each of these WFHQs will consist of a commander, an AOC, and 
an AFFOR staff, all appropriately tailored to support their 
combatant commander.  The WFHQ commander…should also be 
prepared to assume responsibilities as the C/JFACC.16 
8. Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center (MHQ-
MOC) 
The Navy’s contribution to the SJFHQ is the Maritime Headquarters with 
Maritime Operations Center (MHQ-MOC).  This organization is designed to 
                                            
15 U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Pamphlet 3 – Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint 
Force Headquarters (SJFHQ),” 1.  http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/jwfcpam3.pdf. 
Accessed May 2006. 
16 Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organization. 41. 
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parallel the Air Force WFHQ/AOC described above.  The development of the 
Maritime Headquarters architecture is still very much in the embryonic stages, 
and has not yet appeared in official doctrine. 
In CNO Guidance for 2006: Meeting the Challenge of a New Era, Admiral 
Michael Mullen outlines several steps that the Navy-Marine Corps team will take 
in order to increase contributions to the joint force.  The first item listed reads: 
“Establish and enable Globally Networked Joint Force Maritime Component 
Commanders (JFMCCs), leveraging deployed forces to provide access, 
dominance, persistence and shaping – to include capturing C2 relationships with 
assigned intelligence assets within and between JFMCC’s.”17  Responsibility for 
the development of these JFMCCs was assigned to Commander, Fleet Forces 
Command in Norfolk, VA.  Commander, Second Fleet was delegated 
developmental responsibility for the JFMCC concept.  The MHQ-MOC is 
designed to be the fulfillment of the globally-networked JFMCC concept. 
9. Network, Information Operations, and Space Center Space Cell 
Headquartered at Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base, Virginia, the Naval 
Network Warfare Command is the Navy’s type commander (TYCOM) for all 
space assets.  This command also has responsibility for network and information 
operations.  NETWARCOM’s command center is known as the Network, 
Information Operations, and Space Center (NIOSC). 
Within the NIOSC is the Space Cell, responsible for providing reachback 
support for deployed naval units and theater JFMCC’s.  The mission of the 
NIOSC Space Cell is to interface between the joint space arena and the maritime 
customer, translating maritime requirements into joint terms, and providing 
support specific to maritime operations.  The Space Cell is essentially an 
extension of the JFMCC or afloat commander’s staff, one with a combination of 
maritime and space expertise.18 
 
                                            
17 Admiral Michael Mullen, USN, “CNO Guidance for 2006”, 7. 
http://www.navy.mil/features/2006CNOG.pdf. Accessed May 2006. 
18 Naval Network Warfare Command, “NIOSC Space Cell,” (brief, Norfolk, VA, 24 Apr 2006). 
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10.  Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR) 
The Director of Space Forces is a U.S. Air Force officer, normally an O-6, 
who is a member of the COMAFFOR/CFACC Commander’s staff.  Normally, the 
COMAFFOR/CFACC will have been designated as Space Coordinating Authority 
by the JFC, and the DIRSPACEFOR will execute that authority on behalf of the 
CFACC.  The DIRSPACEFOR operates primarily in a planning and deconfliction 
role.  He has the necessary knowledge to provide space-related input to theater 
planning processes, and the reachback capability to integrate the entirety of 
national security space assets in support of theater operations. 
Although the DIRSPACEFOR coordinates with and provides support to 
the other service component commanders (in effect making it a joint position), 
the actual billet is provided from the U.S. Air Force Space Command, thus 
dictating that the position be filled only by Air Force personnel and be assigned 
no higher than the COMAFFOR staff.19 
11. Army Space Support Team 
The ARSSTs are USASMDC assets from the Active Army, USAR 
and ARNG. ARSSTs rapidly deploy worldwide within 48 hours to 
augment corps and division space expertise, normally within the G3 
section, during exercises and contingency operations, including 
combat operations. Their primary support is at the operational and 
tactical levels. ARSSTs may be assigned to support other levels in 
Army or non-Army units.20 
12. Space Support Element 
While the ARSST is a non-organic space support asset for Army forces, 
the Space Support Element (SSE) is organic to Army tactical headquarters, 
normally the division or joint task force level.  An SSE normally consists of two 
Functional Area 40 (FA 40) Space Operations Officers.  The SSE provides space 
support both to its headquarters unit and subordinate units as required.  If 
necessary, the SSE can be augmented by an ARSST.21 
 
                                            
19 Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organization. 57. 
20 Field Manual 3-14: Space Support to Army Operations. C-1. 
21 Ibid, E-1 
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B. CONCEPTS 
1. Coordinating Authority  
Coordinating Authority is defined as:  
A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating 
specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more 
Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or 
more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has 
the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, 
but does not have the authority to compel agreement.22 
2. Space Authority 
To facilitate unity of the theater/joint operations area (JOA) space 
effort, the supported combatant commander or a joint force 
commander (JFC) may designate a space authority. The space 
authority will coordinate space operations, integrate space 
capabilities, and have primary responsibility for in-theater joint 
space operations planning…the space authority designated by the 
JFC will coordinate space support of established objectives and act 
on behalf of the combatant commander with primary responsibility 
in theater for joint space operations planning.23 
3. Space Coordinating Authority (SCA) 
Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, combines the joint terms 
“coordinating authority” and “space authority” as “space coordinating authority.”  
AFDD 2 provides finer granularity of detail regarding the roles and responsibilities 
of the SCA, and outlines the logic for assignment of SCA to the CFACC.24 
4. Joint Warfighting Space  
The concept aims to provide operationally responsive access to 
and the tactical exploitation of space/near-space.  The JWS 
concept is best characterized as a responsive, end-to-end 
networked set of space/near-space capabilities dedicated to the 
JFC and integrated with NSS systems.  The JWS concept calls for 
the deployment of expeditionary space forces that deliver 
responsive space capabilities to the JFC to achieve operational and 
tactical effects in support of assigned missions.25 
                                            
22 Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). GL-6. 
23 Joint Publication 3-14: Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. ix. 
24 Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organization. 56. 
25 U.S. Air Force, “Operating Concept for Joint Warfighting Space (Draft),” 13 Jan 2005, 9. 
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Joint Warfighting Space will require a different command and control 
paradigm than that currently exercised for space forces.  Rather than being 
centrally controlled by an organization such as JFCC SPACE, forces which are 
developed under the JWS concept are intended to be under the direct control of 
the Joint Force Commander (JFC).26 
5. Space Effects  
The term “space effects,” sometimes used to generically describe the 
various outputs of space mission areas, does not appear in joint literature.  The 
word “effects” can lead to confusion, and as defined in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 
(Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associate Terms), does not 
communicate the concept correctly.  Instead, we will use the terms “space force 
application” and “space force enhancement” as defined in JP 1-02 to describe 
the space mission area outputs which are used by the warfighter. 
a. Effect: A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of 
freedom.27 
b. Space Force Application: Combat operations in, through, and 
from space to influence the course and outcome of conflict. The 
space force application mission area includes ballistic missile 
defense and force projection.28 
c. Space Force Enhancement: Combat support operations to 
improve the effectiveness of military forces as well as support other 
intelligence, civil, and commercial users. The space force 
enhancement mission area includes: intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance; integrated tactical warning and attack assessment; 
command, control, and communications; position, velocity, time, 
and navigation; and environmental monitoring.29 
                                            
26 U.S. Air Force, “Operating Concept for Joint Warfighting Space (Draft),” 13 Jan 2005, 4. 
27 Joint Publication 1-02:Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 
176. 
28 Ibid., 493. 
29 Ibid., 493. 
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III. JOINT SPACE COORDINATION TASK 
 In the fall of 2005, USSTRATCOM initiated a project titled the Joint Space 
Coordination Task (JSCT).  This project was designed to research three specific 
theater space command and control issues.  The JSCT was to first, “conduct 
analysis to determine the current coordination process (in theater) for the 
DIRSPACEFOR in support of CDR USCENTCOM”; second, “identify 
DIRSPACEFOR requirements of all other Regional and Functional Combatant 
Commanders”; and third, “identify the GSCA’s roles, responsibilities, and 
relationship with the theater DIRSPACEFOR.”  This project took approximately 6 
months and provided specific feedback and recommendations for improving 
theater space coordination.30   
A. MILITARY SPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION 
In order to understand the roles of the concept of SCA and the position of 
DIRSPACEFOR, it is important to review the overarching military space C2 
architecture.  First, USSTRATCOM is responsible for ensuring that the United 
States can perform the four doctrinal space mission areas of space support, 
space force enhancement, space control, and space force application.  Through 
JFCC SPACE, USSTRATCOM “integrates all elements of military power to 
conduct, plan, and present global strike effects and also direct the deliberate 
planning and execution of assigned space operation missions.”31  STRATCOM 
has assigned Global Space Coordinating Authority (GSCA) to JFCC SPACE.  
The Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) is the central node for the 
command and control of all DoD space forces.  At a peer level with 
USSTRATCOM are the other geographic Combatant Commands (COCOMs).  
Each COCOM utilizes a somewhat different construct for coordinating required 
                                            
30 Randy Hugenroth, “Joint Space Coordination Task Final Report,” (Omaha, NE: Booz Allen 
Hamilton, 28 Feb 2006): 2. 
31 U.S. Strategic Command, “Functional Components,” http://www.stratcom.mil/organization-
fnc_comp.html. Accessed May 2006. 
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space support.32  The CENTCOM organization is detailed in this chapter; 
Chapter IV outlines the remainder of the COCOM structures. 
B. CENTCOM SPACE COORDINATION CONSTRUCT 
The JSCT reviewed the details of the CENTCOM DIRSPACEFOR 
construct in order to provide recommendations for future theater space 
coordination developments.  As discussed in Chapter II, the DIRSPACEFOR 
serves as the senior space officer to the CFACC.  However, when the Air Force 
created the DIRSPACEFOR position, it did so outside of joint doctrine.  
Therefore, the CENTCOM DIRSPACEFOR does not serve in a joint billet.  The 
Air Force, through Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), nominates officers to 
serve as the CENTCOM DIRSPACEFOR.  The current AFSPC policy is to 
nominate a sitting Operations Group or Wing Commander to the position of 
DIRSPACEFOR.  The theater CFACC reviews and approves the nominations.  
The DIRSPACEFOR serves a 4-month tour at the CFACC, while an Army space 
operations officer serves a 12-month tour as the Deputy DIRSPACEFOR.33   
Although the position is not on the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) staff, 
the DIRSPACEFOR effectively serves as the senior space officer in the entire 
CENTCOM AOR.  The CENTCOM Commander has delegated space 
coordinating authority to the CFACC.  The DIRSPACEFOR serves on the 
CFACC’s special staff and advises the CFACC on theater space capabilities and 
coordination.  The DIRSPACEFOR coordinates with the CAOC to provide the 
CFACC and the JFC with a central space coordination point for all functional 
components within the theater.  Ground elements with SSEs or ARSSTs may 
conduct direct coordination with the DIRSPACEFOR and the CAOC.  The 
DIRSPACEFOR and CAOC are able to reach back primarily with the JSpOC, but 
also with other National Security Space agencies, depending on the required 
support.34    
 
                                            
32 Hugenroth, 7-9. 
33 Ibid, 6-7. 
34 Ibid., 4. 
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C. CENTCOM SPACE COORDINATION PROCESS 
The CENTCOM DIRSPACEFOR and CFACC issued a formal Space 
Coordination Plan (SCP) in January 2006.  This plan provides a four step 
process for ensuring that all available space capabilities are used effectively 
during theater operations.  The first step is called the Initial Planning Phase, 
during which any CJTF or component planning staff within CENTCOM that is 
planning a major named operation may initiate a dialogue with the CAOC 
Strategy Division.  If the operation requires space capabilities to achieve the 
desired effect, then the CAOC Strategy Division begins coordinating with the 
DIRSPACEFOR to initiate reachback planning.  The second step is the 
Reachback Planning Cycle that allows the DIRSPACEFOR to coordinate with all 
appropriate National Security Space agencies that provide capabilities which 
could enhance the planned operation.  The third step is the CJTF/Component 
Commander Review, which gives the supported commander the chance to 
review and concur or non-concur with the recommended space support.  Once 
the supported commander concurs, then the process generates a formal request  
to the CFACC for coordination, approval, and execution.35 
This entire process could take from a few hours to a week or more, 
depending on the type of space support which was requested.  The SCP also 
uses an official Space Support Request (SSR) form which allows the CAOC and 
the DIRSPACEFOR to tracking the space coordination process.  Space Support 
Requests are tracked by the CAOC Combat Operations Division.36 
D. JSCT CONCLUSIONS 
The JSCT finalized its report in February 2006 and presented several 
bottom line conclusions.  These discussed the various positive and negative 
aspects of the SCA terminology, the DIRSPACEFOR position, and 
recommended initiating for the rewrite of Joint Publication 3-14 as soon as 
possible.37 
                                            
35 Hugenroth, 5-6. 
36 Ibid, 6. 
37 Ibid., 2. 
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Space Coordinating Authority is not a term found in joint doctrine.  The 
JSCT found that the absence of an overall definition for this and other terms has 
created some confusion within the joint space community.  Despite proposals to 
eliminate this terminology, SCA and GSCA continue to be refined by 
USSTRATCOM and the Air Force.  The JSCT recommended that the 
terminology be included in future joint publications once the joint space 
community has had a chance to more fully develop the concept.38 
With respect to the DIRSPACEFOR, the JSCT recommends that this 
position be developed in future joint doctrine and be renamed as the “Joint Space 
Coordination Officer.”  The basic issue for the JSCT was the fact that the 
DIRSPACEFOR is solely an Air Force construct and is not fully understood by 
most within the joint space community.39   
The fact that AFSPC nominates the DIRSPACEFOR from its pool of O-6 
Wing or Group commanders was determined to be a point of contention with 
other services.  One concern stems from the fact that the current process 
excludes senior “space smart” officers from other services, since only Air Force 
officers can fill an Air Force-generated billet.  Another concern has to do with 
selection source and tour length of the DIRSPACEFOR.  The intent of the 
DIRSPACEFOR position is not only to provide a senior “space smart” officer but 
also one who has theater expertise.  However, the Air Force chooses its 
DIRSPACEFORs from a pool of Wing or Group commanders that may or may 
not have any relationship to the CENTCOM theater.  Also, the Air Force deploys 
each DIRSPACEFOR for approximately 120 days, which limits the amount of 
theater expertise a DIRSPACEFOR can gain once in theater.40 
The JSCT recommended that the development of the “Joint Space 
Coordination Officer” would help mitigate the exclusion of senior space officers 
from other services.  Also, the JSCT highly recommended that the Air Force  
 
                                            




extend the tour of its DIRSPACEFOR officers.  It recommended that the theater’s 
senior space officer should serve for at least a year, three times as long as 
DIRSPACEFOR’s currently serve.41 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT CENTCOM CONSTRUCT 
A. HISTORY OF THE CENTCOM DIRSPACEFOR POSITION 
Although the 1991 Gulf War is often referred to as the first space war, 
increasing utilization of space support and force enhancement did not imply 
commensurate sophistication in the intra- and inter-theater coordination of that 
support.  For the next 10 years, space coordination was largely an ad hoc 
construct depending in part on educated officers and fortuitous personal 
relationships at the various commands which provided space support and force 
enhancement.42 
In November 2002, the CAOC team which was to execute Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) conducted Exercise Internal Look 2002.43 During this 
exercise the position of Senior Space Officer (SSO) (which would eventually be 
renamed the Director of Space Forces) began to be outlined, as that role did not 
exist in current Air Force CONOPS.44  Prior to the actual commencement of OIF, 
the SSO and his support team focused on the development of command 
relationships within the CENTCOM AOR.  These relationships were 
understandably fragmented, as the SSO was a new concept undergoing 
operational testing in a real-world situation.  Immediately prior to the start of OIF, 
CENTCOM designated the CFACC as the Space Coordinating Authority (SCA) 
for the theater, in order to manage the volume of support requests being sent to 
the 14th Air Force’s Joint Space Operations Center (JSOC) by individual service 
components.45[3]  Two other concerns the SSO team began to address were 
“ensuring missile warning capabilities and addressing potential Iraqi Global 
Positioning System (GPS) jamming capabilities.”46  The SSO team provided a  
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valuable synergizing effect in the areas of space support and force 
enhancement, specifically missile warning, GPS accuracy prediction, and GPS 
jamming mitigation. 
During the three years since its inception, the DIRSPACEFOR concept 
has undergone continuous refinement.  Each officer assigned the role has added 
personal expertise and vision, and has built upon the efforts of previous 
DIRSPACEFORs.  A theater Space Coordination Plan is in place, approved by 
CENTCOM, and best practices are beginning to be captured in theater and 
service policy.  This construct is clearly fulfilling the primary responsibilities which 
have been assigned to it.  However, it has not been analyzed in detail to 
determine whether it is an efficient, and not simply effective, construct.  
Additionally, the space coordination construct being applied in CENTCOM is not 
a product of joint doctrine, and therefore is not required to be applied uniformly in 
all theaters. 
B. POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE CENTOM CONSTRUCT 
1. Space Expertise 
The addition of a dedicated senior officer on the CFACC staff provides a 
level of space expertise not previously available in theater.  While the CAOC 
divisions have Space Weapons Officers assigned, and there is a company-grade  
(O-3) space officer at the CENTCOM headquarters in Qatar, the DIRSPACEFOR 
brings an entire career of space experience and connections to the CFACC.  It is 
highly likely that an officer assigned to this position will have attended both junior 
and senior level professional schools (ACSC, SASS, or another service 
equivalent) and so will have an understanding of joint warfare concepts.  As the 
DIRSPACEFOR and his support personnel interact with the theater operational 
planning and execution process, the big-picture view of operations coupled with 
the understanding of how space support or force enhancement capabilities can 





2. Extensive Reachback 
As a sitting wing commander or operations group commander, the 
DIRSPACEFOR possesses extensive reachback capabilities.  While each 
service primarily uses reachback to its own individual support structure (ARSST 
to SMDC-OC, CSG to NIOSC), the DIRSPACEFOR is able to reach back not just 
to the JSpOC but to the national security space organization as a whole.  The 
DIRSPACEFOR is thus able to leverage a much broader range of systems and 
organizations than any individual service component. 
C. NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE CENTCOM CONSTRUCT 
1. Service Centric 
The DIRSPACEFOR concept was created by the Air Force, not 
STRATCOM or a unified commander.  While the initiative to create the position in 
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom was correct and proper at the time, the 
service-specific nature of the concept has become a detriment.  Right or wrong, 
the other services view the creation of a uniquely Air Force position responsible 
for all space coordination in a theater as an exclusionary extension of the Air 
Force’s influence.  The fact that it is an Air Force-provided billet excludes even 
well-qualified senior space cadre from other services from filling the position.  
This induces resentment (however unjustified) rather than support among the 
other services, and in fact does prevent the theater or CFACC from drawing on 
additional space expertise among the other services’ space cadre.47 
2. Theater “Outsider” 
Since the DIRSPACEFOR is drawn from a CONUS-based command, he 
is not an expert in the organization, culture, or operations of the theater to which 
he might be assigned.  In addition, the tour length for a DIRSPACEFOR is only 
four months long.  The combination of these two factors results in an extremely 
compressed timeline for the DIRSPACEFOR to arrive in theater, synchronize 
with theater operations, build relationships, and begin operating effectively.  More 
serious than a degraded level of effectiveness is the fact that theater 
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commanders are reluctant to accept onto their key staff someone who is 
unfamiliar with the particulars of their particular area of operations.48 
3. Incomplete Definition 
The roles and responsibilities of the DIRSPACEFOR, along with the 
nature of the Space Coordinating Authority which he executes, are not yet well-
defined.  Best practices are being developed at the tactical and operational levels 
in CENTCOM and other theaters, and are just now beginning to appear in 
doctrine documents such as AFDD 2.  This is largely a result of the still-immature 
nature of the DIRSPACEFOR concept; unfortunately, the fact remains that in 
many ways the DIRSPACEFOR team is exploring its battlespace rather than 
executing a well-established set of tasks. 
4.  Wrong Level of Warfare 
A case can be made that the DIRSPACEFOR (or more specifically, SCA) 
has been placed at the wrong level of warfare.49  It is believed that this 
coordinating authority, given its joint scope, ought to be assigned to the 
combatant commander’s direct staff, rather than that of the CFACC.  As a 
member of the JFC’s staff, the position executing SCA would have greater 
visibility over a wide range of theater operations, and more influence with the 
command authorities who could drive the coordination which today the SCA can 
only recommend. 
D. COMPARISON WITH OTHER THEATERS 
The JSCT report outlines the ways in which the SCA concept is being 
applied at the other COCOMs, and reveals that there are as many ways to 
conduct theater space coordination as there are theaters to coordinate.  This 
disparity among the different theaters arises from several different reasons, all of 
which address valid concerns.  However, the net result is that there is no 
standard space coordination construct which is globally applicable and easily 
understood by any user entering a particular theater.  The following section 
outlines the JSCT report’s findings in each theater. 
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1. USPACOM 
In the PACOM AOR, SCA is delegated to the JFACC.  This is also the 
case with USFK (although in Korea the JFACC is designated as a CFACC).  In 
both cases, the JFACC utilizes an officer designated as the DIRSPACEFOR to 
execute SCA, a position which is only active during exercises such as 
TERMINAL FURY or ULCHI FOCUS LENS.  For USFK, the title of the 
DIRSPACEFOR becomes the Space Coordinating Officer if conducting joint 
operations.50 (Note: The Space Coordinating Officer terminology is not found in 
any service or joint publication.) 
Should a situation arise in PACOM similar to that in CENTCOM, where 
daily combat operations are being conducted, it is reasonable to assume that the 
DIRSPACEFOR position would be activated and utilized in much the same 
manner as is currently the case in CENTCOM. 
2. USEUCOM 
SCA has not been delegated in the EUCOM AOR, and is normally 
exercised by the Chief, Space Operations Branch.  Should the AOR transition to 
a JTF, it is expected that SCA would be delegated to the JFACC.  In all 
likelihood, the JFACC would be a Navy staff embarked onboard USS MOUNT 
WHITNEY (LCC-20), the command ship for Commander, SIXTH FLEET.  The 
construct of a DIRSPACEFOR deployed from CONUS is not favored in EUCOM 
due to a lack of theater-specific background and joint perspective.51 
If a situation requiring the formation of a JTF occurred in EUCOM, the staff 
position which executed SCA would most likely be chosen from within the 
theater, and would be a direct representative from the COCOM to the JFACC 
staff within the JTF.  It is important to note that the actual officer executing SCA 
would probably be a Navy, rather than Air Force, officer. 
3. USNORTHCOM 
SCA within NORTHCOM is currently retained at the COCOM level and 
has not been delegated lower.  The Air Force deployed an officer with JTF 
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KATRINA to act as DIRSPACEFOR, but that position was not executing SCA for 
NORTHCOM, nor acting in a joint capacity.52 
4. USSOUTHCOM 
SOUTHCOM's SCA role is carried out by their J-3.  This has not 
been formally delegated to him but is done by default.  
SOUTHCOM noted they have very few space issues, and as a 
result it is on the back burner for them.  They do not use a 
DIRSPACEFOR and one is not provided for them.53 
5. USSOCOM 
SOCOM has designated their space branch to execute SCA 
responsibilities.  He would be the senior space officer for the JTF 
and assumes the SCA for the SOCOM JTF when stood up.  They 
also do not have a DIRSPACEFOR.54 
E. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Although the DIRSPACEFOR concept was introduced over three years 
ago, it is still an immature construct due to the complexity of its roles and wide 
scope of employment.  A concept which must consider the needs of six unified 
commanders, leverage a broad spectrum of assets, support dynamic wartime 
operations in one theater, and cope with rapidly changing organizational 
constructs will not develop quickly.  One thing is clear – the Air Force’s 
development of the DIRSPACEFOR concept was timely and relevant to current 
operations.  The concept is flawed, but not fatally so.  A few “tweaks” and 
adjustments, relatively minor in the grand scheme of military operations, will 
succeed in more closely aligning it to theater needs and including other services 
in its execution. 
Of all the unified commanders, PACOM has an overall construct which 
appears to most closely mirror that currently in place in CENTCOM.  This may be 
due to the relatively high pace of activity in PACOM and the higher possibility of 
combat action there relative to other theaters.  The fact that each theater has a 
markedly different way of doing business, one that is often not exercised under 
                                            




strenuous conditions, is a detriment to the global standardization necessary for 
today’s military forces to effectively operate in any theater, regardless of their 
home base.  While no “one size fits all” construct can be found, a baseline 
template which can be applied to all unified commands and modified as 
necessary to meet specific AOR needs must be developed in order to prevent a 
steep learning curve during combat operations, when the price of learning new 
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V. SERVICE COMPONENT ARCHITECTURES 
A.  U.S. NAVY ORGANIZATION 
1. Naval Space Campaign 
Beginning in 2001, both the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Navy 
made significant changes in the organization of their space components.   The 
Secretary of Defense released a memorandum with the subject “National 
Security Space Management and Organization” in October 2001.  Among other 
things, this memorandum directed the services to establish and develop a cadre 
of space professionals to execute the national security space mission.55 The 
Navy stood up Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command (NNWC) in May 
2002, simultaneously renaming Naval Space Command as Naval Network and 
Space Operations Command (NNSOC), which became the operations (N-3) arm 
of NNWC.56  In June 2003, DoD Directive 5101.2 designated the Air Force as the 
DoD Executive Agent for Space.57  In response to these changes, the Naval 
Space Campaign began in the fall of 2004, with Commander, NETWARCOM, 
Commander, SECOND Fleet (C2F), and Commander, Carrier Strike Group 
EIGHT taking part.58 
In the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Guidance for 2005, the conduct of 
a Naval space strategy and Campaign Plan was formally tasked to Commander, 
Fleet Forces Command (CFFC, now Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command).59  Commander, NETWARCOM was tasked by CFFC as the lead 
agency for the Naval Space Campaign development.60 
                                            
55 The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, memorandum, 18 October 2001, National Security 
Space Management and Organization, 13. 
56 Naval Network Warfare Command, “Naval Network Warfare Command 
(COMNAVNETWARCOM), https://ekm.netwarcom.navy.mil/netwarcom/nnwc-
nipr/directory/about.htm. Accessed June 2006. 
57 Department of Defense Directive 5101.2, “Executive Agent for Space,” 03 June 2003: 3. 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d51012_060303/d51012p.pdf. Accessed June 2006. 
58 Naval Network Warfare Command, “Naval Space Campaign Plan”, 13 November 2005, 4.  
59 Admiral Vernon Clark, USN, “CNO Guidance for 2005”, 20.  
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/clark-guidance2005.pdf. Accessed June 2006. 
60 Naval Network Warfare Command, “Naval Space Campaign Plan”, 13 Nov 2005, 7. 
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The Naval Space Campaign focuses on “delivering space capabilities to 
the warfighter to increase combat effectiveness.”61  Commander, Carrier Strike 
Group EIGHT is Commander, SECOND FLEET’s Executive Agent for the 
execution of the first iteration of the campaign plan.62  Through various training 
opportunities, the strike group senior leadership has been exposed to the 
capabilities of DoD and national space systems, and possible applications of 
those systems to maritime operations.  As Carrier Strike Group EIGHT 
progresses through its training and deployment cycle, it will develop opportunities 
to apply space systems to maritime operations, and provide lessons-learned 
feedback to refine the space campaign.  The overall goal is to be able to apply 
both the training and operational execution to follow-on strike groups Navy-wide. 
2. Current Navy CSG-level Space Organization 
At the tactical level, Commander, Carrier Strike Group EIGHT has 
established a space organization within his staff to execute day-to-day space 
planning and operations (Fig. 1).  This organization is not comprised of additional 
billets provided to the staff, but instead takes personnel from within the staff and 
assigns them additional duties for space operations. 
SPACE OPS (N3S)
CDR, also Air Ops and DIWC
SPACE-IO (N3S11)
CTTC, also Asst. EWO
NATIONAL SPACE (N3S2)
LT, also NIOC OIC
JOINT SPACE (N3S3)
O-3/4 Navy Space Cadre AQD
ASST SPACE OPS (N3S1)
LCDR(sel), also EWO
ASST NATIONAL SPACE (N3S21)
CTTC, also Asst NIOC OIC
 
Figure 1.   CSG-8 Space Organization63 
 
                                            
61 Ibid,. 1. 
62 Ibid., 4. 
63 Commander Zigmond Leszczynski, USN, e-mail message to author, 14 Feb 2006. 
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The strike group space organization is able to reach back to the NIOSC 
Space Cell, which acts as a virtual staff for the strike group space operations 
officer.  The NIOSC Space Cell provides the capability for in-depth research of 
specific areas, as well as reachback (or reach-out) to joint and national space 
organizations in support of maritime operations planning.  If required, the JSpOC 
or the theater DIRSPACEFOR can provide additional reachback capabilities. 
In preparation for deployment to the CENTCOM AOR, the strike group 
space operations officer has begun coordination with the CENTCOM CFMCC 
and DIRSPACEFOR to begin building the space coordination links which will be 
utilized once the strike group is in theater.  The basic structure has the strike 
group space operations officer utilizing reachback to the NIOSC Space Cell for 
future planning, while working with the DIRSPACEFOR in order to provide 
required support to ongoing maritime operations.  The DIRSPACEFOR, with his 
ability to interface with national systems, will be able to bring together the 
national products and maritime operators in a synthesized fashion which aims to 
provide significant enhancement to theater maritime operations.   
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Figure 2 represents the space coordination construct with which CSG-8 will 
deploy in the fall of 2006. 
 
 
Figure 2.   CSG-8 Current Space Coordination Construct64 
[From Naval Space Campaign Brief] 
 
3. Future Theater and CSG-level Space Organization 
The Navy is developing space coordination organizations at multiple 
levels.  The CSG-level organization will undergo refinement as CSG-8 deploys 
and provides feedback to USFFC.  However, it will most likely not change 
significantly in the near future.  The continued focus at this level will be the 
integration of space support into the existing N-organizations (N2, N3, N6) in 
order to enhance their individual mission areas. 
The space organization which will be a part of the MHQ is not yet well-
developed.  There is in fact a certain level of resistance to the inclusion of a 
space coordination cell within the MHQ structure, mostly due to the lack of 
widespread understanding of the ubiquitous nature of space support to maritime  
 
                                            
64 Naval Network Warfare Command, “Naval Space Campaign,” (brief, Maritime 
Headquarters Operational Advisory Group, Norfolk, VA, 06 Jun 2006). 










operations.  While the exact nature of the space coordination cell within the MHQ 
will be developed separately, the existence of such a cell will be a key enabler as 
the MHQ executes its mission.   
At each level of warfare, whether tactical, operational, or strategic, a 
space coordination cell of some type needs to be present in order to provide the 
synergizing effect that makes space capabilities a significant force multiplier.  
The space coordination cell will be able to combine organic expertise and 
dedicated reachback with visibility over the organization’s plans and operations 
to ensure that the fullest integration of space capabilities takes place.  Figure 3 
represents the first step in the Navy space coordination construct of the future, 
while Figure 4 represents the desired end state with the MHQ/MOC fully realized.  
Key components of this construct are the interfaces between the theater and the 
deployed CSG.  The presence of a space coordination cell at the MHQ-MOC 
provides the deployed CSG with a single point of contact for all of its space 
support and force enhancement requests.  In addition, the space coordination 
cell at the MHQ-MOC will have visibility over the operations of all CSGs and 
CTFs operating within its AOR, and will be able to proactively integrate space 




Figure 3.   CSG-X Future Space Coordination Construct65 
 
 
Figure 4.   CSG-X Space Coordination Construct with MOC66 
[From Naval Space Campaign Brief] 
                                            
65 Naval Network Warfare Command, “Naval Space Campaign,” (brief, Maritime 
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66 Naval Network Warfare Command, “Naval Space Campaign,” (brief, Maritime 
Headquarters Operational Advisory Group, Norfolk, VA, 06 Jun 2006). 




























B. ARMY C/JFLCC SPACE C2 ARCHITECTURE 
The Army has been developing its theater space support coordination 
architecture for a number of years.  The basic approach that the Army uses to 
concentrate its development efforts is warfighter focused.  The Army recognizes 
that it does not have the resources or the need to spend time building or flying 
satellites.  Instead, the Army places almost all of its developmental emphasis on 
leveraging the capability of currently fielded space systems to more effectively 
support warfighting decision makers at the lowest possible level.   
The Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) is studying the 
issue of theater space support from two perspectives.  The first perspective 
represents a current view of theater space support and is discussed in an SMDC 
document entitled Army Theater Space Support in Joint Operations – Today.  
The second perspective represents a mid-term view that examines theater space 
support during the timeframe of 2015 to 2024.67 
1. Current CFLCC-level Space Support  
The current Army perspective of theater space support, while focused on 
developing a unified theater space coordination architecture, includes two 
parallel programs that support the overall aim.  One program is focused on 
embedding officers with space expertise in the operational level warfighting 
commands throughout the Army.  The other program is focused on refining the 
support currently provided by the Army Space Support Teams (ARSSTs) that are 
part of the Army’s 1st Space Brigade, based at Peterson AFB in Colorado 
Springs, CO.  These two programs are intended to complement each other, 
despite certain redundancies that exist within their development.68 
a.  Organic SSEs 
In Fiscal Year 2004, the Army began a program whose goal was to 
embed Space Operations Officers (SOOs) in the headquarters staff of each Army 
command above the division level.  The Army has 10 active divisions (2-star 
                                            
67 Kirby Brown, Director, Space and Missile Defense Battle Lab.  Presentation provided to 
author during a briefing at the Functional Area 40 Training Conference in Long Beach, CA.  31 
May 2006. 
68 Army Theater Space Support in Joint Operations – Today, 6. 
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command), 4 active corps (3-star), and 3 active army (4-star) commands.  Two to 
six SOOs serve on the staff of these echelon commands in what is currently 
known as a Space Support Element (SSE).  By the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, 
the Army will have fielded SSEs in 7 of 10 divisions, 1 of 4 corps, and 1 of 3 
armies.  The fielding plan for all SSEs is scheduled to be completed by the end of 
FY 2009.  All officers manning the SSEs come from the Army’s Space 
Operations Functional Area (FA40).  The Army has been working to formally 
define its space cadre and the group of officers known as “FA40s” form the part 
of the Army Space Cadre known as “Space Professionals.”69   
A key component to this fielding plan is establishing the SSE at the 
army four-star command level staff.  The Army has begun placing 1 Colonel, 2 
Lieutenant Colonels, and 3 Majors in an SSE at the Army Central Command 
(ARCENT) staff at Fort McPherson, GA, which is the Army Component 
Command for Central Command.  With the establishment this SSE, the Army has 
placed a team of officers with space expertise at the service component 
command level within a combatant commander’s region.  Previously, the only 
service component command to have this resident expertise was the 
COMAFFOR.70 
By establishing an ARCENT SSE, the Army now has the 
opportunity to place full time space expertise on the land component command 
staff that supports both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  Placing this team at the CFLCC level has certain advantages and 
disadvantages that impact the future theater space coordination architecture. 
The primary advantage for establishing an ARCENT SSE is that it 
provides the CFLCC with the organic capability for identifying space mission 
related requirements and for conducting space mission related planning for 
current and future CFLCC operations.  Another advantage for creating the 
                                            
69 Clay Scherer.  Chief, FA40 Proponent & Army Space Cadre Office, Space and Missile 
Defense Command.  Presentation to author during a briefing at the Functional Area 40 Training 
Conference in Long Beach, CA.  31 May 2006. 
70 U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Future Warfare Center, “Army Theater Space 
Support in Joint Operations – Today,” 21. 
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ARCENT SSE is that it establishes a space team that is parallel to the Air Force’s 
CAOC / DIRSPACEFOR team that resides in the CFACC.  By having a parallel 
position to the DIRSPACEFOR, the land component commander through the 
ARCENT SSE Chief, which is an O-6 in rank, can ensure that land component 
space requirements are given equal representation in the theater space 
coordination process.  One last advantage in having the ARCENT SSE team is 
that it puts space expertise in place at a level that can impact the plans and 
activities of space forces throughout the theater’s land component, which helps 
ensure a better overall coordinated plan.   
In general, establishing an SSE in ARCENT has few negative 
aspects.  One particular disadvantage for establishing an ARCENT SSE has to 
do with the placement of six field grade officers with space experience at this 
echelon.  The Army has a limited number of FA40s and assigning six field grade 
officers to this element might be considered an excessive use of senior 
manpower, especially if part of their function is redundant with other 
organizations.   
b. Attached ARSSTs 
Since 1993, the Army has fielded teams of soldiers in what are 
known as Army Space Support Teams (ARSSTs).  The intent of an ARSST is to 
provide space support to a warfighting commander who lacks organic space 
expertise, but only once the commander requests such a team.  Typically, 
ARSSTs only mobilize for training exercise or major deployments.  An ARSST 
can be attached to an Army division, corps, or theater headquarters and easily 
integrate into that echelon staff’s battle rhythm.  An ARSST can also support 
other ground elements, such as a Marine Expeditionary Force commander.71 
Ultimately, the Army is looking to leverage the capability of both 
SSEs and ARSSTs in support of the warfighting commander.  In the near term, 
the basic concept is to ensure that every division commander and above within 
the land component has either an assigned SSE or an attached ARSST available 
                                            
71 U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Future Warfare Center, “Army Theater Space 
Support in Joint Operations – Today,” 19-20. 
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on the staff in order to more effectively use space capabilities.  By placing a 
space team at each echelon, the Army is ensuring that all space activities that 
affect its operations are well-coordinated and planned throughout the 
organization.  Figure 5 shows an organization chart for space teams within a 
notional theater and the relationships that exist between them.  This figure 
illustrates how SSEs are organic to the staff at the echelon for which they are 
assigned.  Also, ARSSTs, which are normally assigned to the 1st Space Brigade, 
are attached to the staff at the echelon for which they have been requested. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Notional Land Component Theater Space Team Organization 
 
2. CFLCC Space Support: 2015 - 2024  
In the mid- and long-term, the Army is approaching the concept of theater 
space support by examining the implications of various DOTMLPF changes.  
Specific changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, and personnel are 
already beginning to have impacts in the military’s use of space capabilities.  
Technological and materiel advances in the form of new high altitude platforms 
and sensors will provide an increase in capability in all space mission areas.  
Doctrine and organizational changes in the form of the Warfighting Headquarters 
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evolution of the training and management of military personnel known as space 
cadre will also help increase the effectiveness of space mission capabilities.72  
How all the services, not just the Army, structure their collective approaches 
towards theater space support will help determine whether or not the future 
theater space support architecture succeeds. 
Currently, the Army is in the beginning stages of developing its future 
theater space support concept.  This development has taken the form of an Army 
Concept Capability Plan (CCP) for Space Operations, which is catalogued as 
Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-4.  This Army document is designed to achieve 
four imperatives.  The first is to “facilitate the integration of space capabilities 
across the full range of Army and Joint operations.”  The second is to “improve 
the Army’s ability to exploit existing space capabilities.”  The third is to “deliver 
space capabilities that address Army needs (capability requirements) and 
priorities by influencing the design of space-based systems and payloads.”  The 
fourth and last imperative is to “systematically and deliberately evolve Army 
space support operations over time to provide dedicated, responsive theater 
focused support to operational and tactical commanders.”73  Throughout this 
document, the Army develops its concept for future space operations capabilities 
within the existing Army concept capability plan framework in order to take 
advantage of the developmental process that eventually leads towards a Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approval to enter the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System process. 
The advantage of the Army theater space support development process is 
that it is evolutionary in nature.  The Army is approaching theater space support 
with a short and long range view in mind while also incrementally increasing its 
inherent capability to exploit current on-orbit capabilities.  The disadvantage to 
this process lies in the fact that it is an Army-centric process and does not 
include input from the other services.   
                                            
72 U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Future Warfare Center, “The United States Army’s 
Concept Capability Plan:  Space Operations – 2015-2024 (Interim Initial Draft),” 5. 
73 U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Future Warfare Center, “The United States Army’s 
Concept Capability Plan:  Space Operations – 2015-2024 (Interim Initial Draft),” 3. 
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C.  U.S. AIR FORCE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
The current Air Force theater space coordination construct has been 
described in detail previously in this thesis, and so will not be repeated here.  
This section will discuss possible drivers which will affect the future structure of 
U.S. Air Force space support command and control. 
The Joint Warfighting Space (JWS) concept has the potential to require 
significant refinement in the USAF theater space coordination organization.  The 
reason for this is its combination of forward-deployed space forces with 
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS).  Although the Joint Tactical Ground 
Station (JTAGS) is a forward-deployed space force, manned jointly by Army and 
Navy personnel, JWS envisions a significantly more robust forward-deployed 
presence.  One particular application being developed under JWS as a USAF 
TENCAP project is Combat SKYSAT, a near-space communications relay 
platform.  The future introduction of this system into a theater brings with it 
significant C2 and airspace control issues for the Air Force to work through. 
Another major component of JWS is ORS.  The ORS concept combines 
rapid-response launch vehicles such as SpaceX’s FALCON 1 with small, 
disposable satellites such as TACSAT.  The eventual goal of this program is to 
be able to provide a theater commander with the ability to request and receive 
the launch of a small satellite tailored to his theater’s requirements within a 
timeframe which meets the operational needs of the particular theater or 
operation.  The eventual development of this capability will require detailed 
analysis of developing C2 constructs to bring together the theater and global 
organizations necessary to assemble, launch, and place into operation a satellite 
dedicated to a specific COCOM.  Not only the tasking, but the day-to-day 
operation of such a satellite are beyond the abilities of the current theater space 
C2 structure. 
Although unlikely to be realized in the near-term, offensive counter-space 
operations from and through space will require a unique set of command and 
control processes to ensure their proper use.  The balance of appropriate levels 
41 
of control with timely and responsive elimination of a threat is only one of many 
challenges to a C2 organization which offensive counter-space capabilities will 
pose. 
D.  SUMMARY 
Each service has unique missions and capabilities, and is responsible to 
develop the coordination constructs which most efficiently deliver those 
capabilities to the Combatant Commander.  However, those C2 constructs 
should not be developed in a service-centric vacuum, without regard to 
concurrent theater or other component development.  The current CENTCOM 
position is to allow each service to develop the C2 construct that suits it best, 
then work at the theater level to integrate all three.  The result of such a process 
will be lost opportunities, degraded effectiveness and efficiency, and significant 
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VI. SPACE COORDINATION CONSTRUCTS 
A. STATUS QUO 
Perhaps the easiest answer to the space coordination dilemma is to 
maintain the current constructs in place in each theater.  Figure 6 depicts the 
basic space coordination construct in place in the CENTCOM AOR.   
 
Figure 6.   Current CENTCOM Space Coordination Organization74 
[After Joint Space AO Coordinating Meeting Brief] 
 
In CENTCOM, the current arrangement is certainly functioning, with 
modifications being made operationally but not organizationally.  The EUCOM 
AOR has established a different construct which aligns with the commander’s 
philosophy and provides the JFC with a satisfactory level of support and 
integration.  Essentially, each combatant commander has developed a construct 
which suits its needs and is more or less effective in accomplishing its goals.  
                                            
74 After Randy Hugenroth, “Joint Space AO Coordination Meeting,” (brief, Washington, D.C., 
18 Jan 2006). 
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Although each JFC has been granted the authority to organize its AOR according 
to its own desires, that does not imply that each theater should develop a unique 
construct to execute what are largely the same set of missions.  Particularly in 
the overseas theaters (EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM), there ought to be a 
certain level of standardization regarding organization, so that a force 
transitioning from one theater to the other is faced with similar or identical 
command constructs.  For the most part, coordination of global space capabilities 
is a process that would be best served by a set of global standard operations 
procedures (SOPs) rather than disparate procedures in each theater.  
Additionally, the interface between the JSpOC and the individual theaters could 
be facilitated by a standard organization in each AOR. 
Maintaining the status quo in each separate theater may be an attractive 
solution in terms of the combatant commander’s autonomy and authority, but as 
space capabilities and services continue to proliferate through all levels of 
operation, either a stagnant or disparate space coordination construct will 
eventually represent a liability to the warfighting commander.  While the need for 
a change in space coordinating construct may not appear to be urgent at the 
current time, waiting until an imperative for change occurs will most likely result in 
too little, too late. 
B. JOINT FORCE SPACE COMPONENT COMMANDER 
Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces, lays out the 
Department of Defense command organization.  According to this document, 
combatant commanders may organize their forces in the manner which best 
accomplishes their assigned mission.75  This organization tends to be set up 
around Service and functional component commands.76  Table 1 lists the 
definitions of functional and service component commands from Joint Publication 
0-2.  Figure 7 represents a notional organization which represents the baseline 
from which the theaters have developed their particular organization. 
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functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, 
composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be 
established across the range of military operations to perform particular 
operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period 
of time.77 
Service component command. A command consisting of the Service 
component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, 
detachments, organizations, and installations under the command, including the 
support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command, or further 
assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. See also 
component; functional component command.78 
Table 1.   Component Command Definitions 
                                            
77 Joint Publication 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces. GL-7. 
78 Ibid., GL-10. 
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Figure 7.   Possible Joint Force Components79 
 
Since the joint force organization includes components for land, air, 
maritime, and special operations, a logical addition to the structure might be a 
joint force space component commander (JFSCC) (see Fig. 8).  This concept has 
been discussed in several publications since 1992, although it has not yet been 
adopted. 
A single point of contact for space coordination is important to maintaining 
unity of effort within a theater.  The establishment of a JFSCC would provide 
such a focus, allowing the JFC and other component commanders to work 
through one component commander to obtain space support and coordinate 
space operations. 
 
                                            
79 Joint Publication 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces. V-3. 
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Figure 8.   Joint Force Space Component Commander Structure80 
[After Joint Space AO Coordinating Meeting Brief] 
 
Another argument for the establishment of a JFSCC is that the DoD 
controls a minority share of the space systems upon which it depends to carry 
out its operations.  The space systems required by a JFC are largely owned by 
the intelligence community (for ISR assets), by civilian corporations (for satellite 
communications), or by other government agencies (for weather assets).  Civilian 
corporations such as Digital Globe operate very capable imaging satellites, 
whose products represent a very viable asset to a theater commander or his 
subordinate commanders.  With space systems spread among so many different 
entities, a JFSCC would serve to leverage all available assets from disparate 
organizations to support operations in his particular theater.81 
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81 Larry Price, Maj, USAF, “Space Operations in the Joint Warfighting Arena: The Viability of 
a Joint Force Space Component Commander,” (master’s thesis, Air Command and Staff College, 





















In an April 2000 research report submitted to the Air Command and Staff 
College, Major Larry Price investigated the feasibility of a JFSCC and presented 
the following conclusions with regard to why a JFSCC is the right construct for 
space coordination in theater: 
If the JFSCC idea is recognized within joint doctrine, it may help 
focus our military as a whole, and certainly those potential 
JFSCC’s, to better integrate space capability throughout joint 
warfighting tactics, techniques, and procedures.  Likewise, it could 
focus our acquisition and budgeting processes to meet the needs of 
the JFC first, instead of, for example, building communications 
enablers for the J6 and intelligence enablers for the J2.  Moreover, 
officially recognizing the JFSCC as part of the joint military structure 
would help ensure space assets are presented to the JFC in the 
most effective and efficient manner possible.  Additionally, 
acknowledging space as an AOR –in joint operational doctrine – 
would legitimize a logical next step in force application.82   
These conclusions are equally as valid for a JFC-level space coordination 
cell as they are for a JFSCC. 
Major Price’s conclusion was that the JFSCC construct was indeed the 
right answer to the theater space coordination issue, although the time was not 
right for its development.  The paper seems to have a dual view of the JFSCC 
concept.  On one hand, the JFSCC is presented as necessary now in order to 
drive certain changes which are imperative in the space community (acquisition, 
TTP development, etc.).  On the other hand, the reason given for not 
implementing the JFSCC in 2000 was that it might be perceived as a separation 
rather than integration of space capabilities within the joint force.83 
There are two key assumptions which underlie the creation of a JFSCC.  
The first is that “space is a medium like the land, sea, and air within which 
military activities will be conducted to achieve U.S. national security objectives.”84  
                                            
82 Larry Price, Maj, USAF, “Space Operations in the Joint Warfighting Arena: The Viability of 
a Joint Force Space Component Commander,” (master’s thesis, Air Command and Staff College, 
Apr 2000), 24. 
83 Ibid., 26. 
84 Department of Defense Directive 3100.10, “Space Policy,” 6. 
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The second is that “space forces comprise an important part of the forces 
available to the Joint Force Commander.”85 
The conduct of force application in and through space has been a hotly-
debated topic for the past several years.  While terrestrial military activities are 
broadly supported by space systems, the mission areas of force application and 
offensive space control have not yet expanded to include assets in the space 
medium.  The DoD Space Policy lists ballistic missile defense and force 
projection as examples of the force application mission area.86  Ballistic missile 
defense is in its infancy, and force projection is not yet being conducted in the 
space medium.  It is likely to be several more years before technology and policy 
allow for on-orbit force application assets.  Based on the range of operations 
being conducted in each of the physical mediums (land, sea, air, and space), it 
seems premature and misleading to define the medium of space as being equal 
to the other three.  While it may become reality in the future, the adoption of that 
assumption as fact in the current and near-future environment is merely wishful 
thinking and produces more confusion than clarity. 
The other foundational assumption for the establishment of a JFSCC is 
that the JFC has space forces available to him which could be assigned to a 
space component commander, just as land, air, or maritime forces are assigned 







                                            
85 Henry D. Baird, Jr., Maj, USAF, “Is it Time for a Joint Force Space Component 
Commander?,” (master’s thesis, Naval War College, 19 Jun 1992), 4. 
86 Department of Defense Directive 3100.10, “Space Policy,” 23. 
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Table 2 provides a review of the terms “operational control” and “tactical 
control” from Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Force. 
Operational Control: OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to 
perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving 
organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating 
objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the 
mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military 
operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to 
the command.87  
Tactical Control: TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached 
forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, 
that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or 
maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned 
missions or tasks. 
TACON provides the authority to: 
• Give direction for military operations; and 
• Control designated forces (e.g., ground forces, aircraft sorties, missile 
launches, or satellite payload management). TACON typically is exercised by 
functional component commanders over military capability or forces made 
available to the functional component for tasking.88 
Table 2.   Command and Control Terminology 
 
As a functional component commander, the JFSCC would typically 
exercise tactical control over space capabilities or space forces made available 
to him by the JFC.  Joint Publication 0-2 discusses the role of a functional 
commander this way: “Functional component commanders have authority over 
forces or military capability made available to them as delegated by the 
establishing JFC. Functional component commands may be established across 
the range of military operations to perform operational missions that may be of 
                                            
87 Joint Publication 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). III-7. 
88 Ibid, III-8 
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short or extended duration.”89  According to the DoD Space Policy, space forces 
are “The space and terrestrial systems, equipment, facilities, organizations, and 
personnel necessary to access, use, and, if directed, control space for national 
security.”90  The question then is what space capabilities or forces does the JFC 
command which could be made available to a JFSCC?  The number of space 
capabilities or forces deployed to CENTCOM is relatively small.  Theater missile 
defense is a good example of this situation.  Joint Tactical Ground Station 
(JTAGS) units, manned by Army and Navy personnel, execute the warning 
component of the theater missile defense mission, using data from DSP satellites 
under the control of Air Force Space Command.  The JTAGS detachments are 
OPCON to JFCC SPACE, and TACON to the COCOM.  Meanwhile, the active 
defense component of the theater missile defense mission is conducted by Army 
Patriot batteries and Navy ships with the AEGIS combat system.  While these 
units are indirectly under the command of the JFC, they are TACON either to the 
Army’s senior air defense commander (in the case of the Patriot units) or to the 
Maritime Component Commander.  Other Army space forces, both SSE’s and 
ARSST’s, are embedded with their parent units, and are only indirectly under 
command of the JFC.  These forces do not represent distinct space forces which 
are available to a space component commander for TACON.  The remainder of 
space capabilities upon which CENTCOM relies is controlled by several different 
entities.  For example, Air Force space systems such as GPS, MILSTAR, or DSP 
are commanded by USSTRATCOM through JFCC SPACE, and controlled by Air 
Force Space Command units.  Although these systems all support the COCOM, 
it is all but certain that actual operational or tactical control of these systems will 
not be given to the COCOM due to their ongoing national and strategic missions.  
Therefore, CENTCOM, and other JFC’s, do not actually command any space 
forces (as DoD Space Policy defines them, at least), which could be assigned to  
 
 
                                            
89 Joint Publication 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). V-18. 
90 Department of Defense Directive 3100.10, “Space Policy,” 23. 
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a space component commander.  The role of a space component commander is 
unclear, since no “forces…or military capability”91 could be made available to that 
commander. 
Based on the current organization of space forces and capabilities, as well 
as the prognosis for near-term developments, the establishment of a JFSCC 
does not appear to be appropriate or beneficial to a JFC.  If, in the future, 
elements of programs such as the Air Force’s Joint Warfighting Space begin to 
be fielded in theater, or force application from on-orbit platforms becomes a 
reality, the concept of a JFSCC should be revisited for applicability. 
 
C. THEATER SPACE COORDINATION CELL 
 
Figure 9.   Theater Space Coordination Cell92 
[After Joint Space AO Coordinating Meeting Brief] 
 
 
                                            
91 Joint Publication 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). III-8. 
92 After Randy Hugenroth, “Joint Space AO Coordination Meeting,” (brief, Washington, D.C., 
18 Jan 2006). 
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The third way to do this is with a permanent and standardized Theater 
Space Coordination Cell (TSCC) at the COCOM level (Fig. 9). The TSCC could 
serve as either a special staff officer on the JFC staff or as a staff position inside 
the JFC J3.  Rather than delegate SCA to a subordinate functional component 
command, the JFC would retain SCA at the COCOM level and the TSCC would 
exercise SCA across the theater.  The person assigned to lead the TSCC should 
be at least an O-6 with a significant amount of combined space and theater 
expertise.  Establishing this billet as a permanent position on the JFC staff helps 
to ensure that the combatant commander has a space expert that is also focused 
on theater issues.  The individual leading the TSCC can come from any service 
and should have a small joint-minded staff that can conduct concurrent planning.  
The TSCC concept provides certain advantages over both the status quo and the 
JFSCC concepts.   
A joint structure would remove the competition for theater SCA that is 
growing between the various services, especially the Army and the Air Force, as 
part of the status quo.  Joint Force Commanders traditionally delegate SCA to 
the JFACC because of the Air Force’s command and control systems and 
institutional space expertise.    Once the Army implements its concept of theater 
space support, a combatant commander might be induced to delegate theater 
SCA to the JFLCC instead of the JFACC based on both the Army’s 
preponderance of space forces and its high degree of use of space capabilities.  
Ultimately, delegating theater SCA to the JFLCC instead of the JFACC does not 
solve the theater space coordination problem – it would simply move the same 
problems to a different functional component.  By not delegating theater SCA, the 
JFC, through the TSCC, objectively ensures the proper implementation of all 
space capabilities. 
An advantage that the TSCC concept has over the JFSCC concept stems 
from the amount of resources that would be necessary to implement the 
concepts.  The TSCC could function in concert with the existing JFC staff and 
would most likely require fewer than a dozen space experts, with all services 
being represented.  The JFSCC concept would require the establishment of a 
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separate and independent functional component command that would need 
many dozens of personnel in order to interface with the JFC staff as well as the 
other functional component commands.  Creating the TSCC internal to the JFC 
staff would require far less resources than creating a JFSCC subordinate to the 
JFC. 
The TSCC concept also fits well into future theater command and control 
architectures.  Joint Forces Command has developed the Standing Joint Force 
Headquarters, which, among other things, is an attempt to standardize the 
theater commander’s warfighting headquarters architectures.  As part of this 
initiative, JFCOM is developing a system of networked operation centers that are 
organized around the functional component commanders.  As each theater 
develops a standardized headquarters organization which is designed to rapidly 
stand up as Joint Force Headquarters, it makes sense that the space 
coordination organization, which ought to be a vital a part of operational planning, 
is similarly standardized across all theaters.  Figure 9 illustrates this 
standardization by embedding space expertise in each of the major components 
inside the JFC commander’s organization.  The JFC commander and staff, which 
includes the TSCC, operate a Joint Operations Center (JOC). Accordingly, the 
JFLCC and its organic space cell in the form of an ASCC SSE operates a LOC. 
The JFACC operates an AOC, which includes its embedded space cell and the 
DIRSPACEFOR.  The JFMCC operates a MOC, which also has an internal 
space cell.  The relationship between the TSCC and the subordinate space cells 
would be the same as the relationships for every other staff section and 
warfighting discipline in order to take advantage of the concept’s standardization. 
The TSCC concept has one final advantage over both the status quo and 
the JFSCC.  The TSCC concept provides an embedded pre-war space planning 
capability that has previously not existed.  In the past, combatant commanders 
have requested liaison officers from either USSPACECOM or USSTRATCOM to 
help complete war planning.  This type of support has proved useful but there is 
a better way.  Rather than bring in liaison officers to advise war planners on how 
space capabilities can support the existing plan, a resident TSCC can advise the 
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war planners on how to leverage space capabilities throughout the planning 
process.  The result is a much more integrated plan that identifies the 
shortcomings of space capabilities early so that other resources can be identified 
to achieve the plan’s required outcomes.  Since the military cannot predict where 
the next crisis is likely to occur, the presence of imbedded space planners at the 
JFC level will ensure that space capabilities are included in the future plans and 
current operations of all theaters. 
The TSCC provides many advantages over both the status quo, which 
suffers from inter-service rivalry and competition, and the JFSCC concept, which 
would suffer from additional bureaucratic and resource constraints.  The TSCC 
will provide a single coordination point that all services can interface with equally.  
The individual that serves as the TSCC will be a permanent part of the JFC team 
rather than a temporary solution that comes from outside of the organization.  
Ultimately, the TSCC concept is the most beneficial solution for the command 
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VII. FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. THESIS SUMMARY 
The development of a theater space coordination architecture is a 
dynamic process.  The interweaving of global assets with theater requirements 
presents a formidable set of challenges.  While each theater places a disparate 
set of demands on space capabilities, those capabilities are delivered by assets 
which are globally distributed and centrally controlled.  This presents a somewhat 
unique situation in the world of military command, control, and coordination, as 
combatant commanders are not able to physically control the assets upon which 
they rely.  Therefore, each COCOM must work out a coordination strategy with 
which to interface with the central controller of each particular asset. 
The command and control of space assets is in itself a significant problem, 
and beyond the scope of this thesis.  As USSTRATCOM continues to refine its 
organization, and JFCC SPACE achieves IOC, the ability of JFCC SPACE to 
both command and control DoD assets, and influence other National Security 
Space agencies will most likely grow.  It is reasonable to assume that in a few 
years, a relatively streamlined concept of operations will begin to be executed by 
the JSpOC in support of combatant commanders worldwide. 
As the providers of space capabilities refine their organization, it is 
important that the customers also develop standardized organizations and 
concepts of operations.  While various options present themselves, each must be 
reviewed carefully for its distinct advantages and disadvantages.  The spectrum 
of choices ranges from maintaining the status quo to the addition of a completely 
separate functional component commander to the JFC structure.  The status quo 
option, based on a hastily-developed DIRSPACEFOR concept, is certain to 
become inadequate in the future, and in its current form has several drawbacks.  
A joint space functional component, on the other hand, is inappropriate given the 
current command and control structure of space forces, as a space component 
commander would have no forces over which to exercise operational or tactical 
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control.  Additionally, the resources required to stand up a separate functional 
component commander in each theater would be nearly prohibitive.  The 
manning for the new JFCC SPACE organization is proposed to be approximately 
131 personnel, which in that case are reorganized rather than newly-created 
billets.93  For a single JFSCC to stand up, the potential of having to create and 
man over 100 completely new billets, along with developing the infrastructure to 
support the command, is a significant drawback. 
A middle option along the spectrum is the assignment of a theater space 
coordination cell to the joint force commander’s staff.  Such a coordination cell 
would require a relatively small footprint; indeed, the DIRSPACEFOR is 
conducting business with fewer than a dozen personnel spread throughout the 
AOC, none of whom are dedicated to support his position.  Placement at the 
theater level would give the space cell visibility across the range of operations 
being conducted by each functional component, and allow for early integration of 
space capabilities into future planning and current operations.  The establishment 
of a cell at the joint force level would open the leadership of the cell up to senior 
officers of all services, and allow the coordination cell to speak with the voice of 
the combatant commander in the space capabilities coordination process.  For 
the near future of theater space coordination, this option appears to be the best, 
in terms of more effectively fulfilling operational requirements as well as simplicity 
of execution. 
The development of a common theater space coordination architecture is 
admittedly not as immediate a priority as defeating improvised explosive devices 
in Iraq or halting the spread of Al Qaeda in the Horn of Africa, yet it will have an 
effect on every single operation undertaken in a theater.  The contribution of 
space capabilities to current operations resembles the advertising motto for the 
BASF Corporation: “We don't make a lot of the products you buy. We make a lot 
of the products you buy better.®”94  While space is not a peer medium of 
                                            
93 Joint Functional Component Command for Space, “JFCC SPACE Stand-Up: Request to 
the Manpower Validation Board” (brief, Omaha, NE, 24 Jul 2006). 
94 BASF, http://www.basf.com/corporate/newsadvertising.html.  Accessed Aug 2006. 
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operations with the land, sea, or air (in the sense of physical operations being 
conducted in it), it contributes in significant ways to all of those operations, 
making them more efficient and effective.  In fact, the denial of services provided 
by any single space capability would have an extremely detrimental effect on a 
theater’s warfighting capabilities.  While current operations in CENTCOM or other 
theaters are not likely to fail because space is not fully utilized, it is certain that 
the integration and coordination of space capabilities at the appropriate level of 
command will result in measurable increases in the effectiveness and efficiency 
over the range of military operations.  In an age where resources of all kinds are 
in short supply, a construct which provides the ability to fully leverage global 
space capabilities in support of theater operations will quickly prove its worth.   
The introduction of the DIRSPACEFOR has proven to be a solid initial 
step, as focused space expertise is being brought to bear in CENTCOM to 
innovatively support current operations and provide theater-wide support for such 
areas as GPS interference and defensive counter-space.  As the window opens 
for the revision of JP 3-14, and after three years of refining the DIRSPACEFOR 
construct, it is time to take the next evolutionary step and elevate the theater 
space coordination role to the joint level.  The establishment of a Theater Space 
Coordination Cell would have several positive effects.  First, it would provide the 
staff charged with theater space coordination with a truly theater-wide view, both 
in the planning and operations regimes.  Second, it would ensure that the theater 
requirements for space capabilities are voiced to providers directly by the 
COCOM, rather than being filtered through several layers of command.  Lastly, it 
would allow senior space personnel from all services to serve in a joint position, 
rather than excluding all but Air Force officers from the role. 
B. FURTHER QUESTIONS 
Much work remains to be done in the area of theater space coordination; 
this thesis has barely begun to scratch the surface.  The establishment of a 
Theater Space Coordination Cell would bring with it unique challenges which 
further research might address.  Some of these questions might be: 
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1) Should the TSCC be assigned within a branch of the JFC staff, such as 
the J-3 (Operations), or should it exist as a separate entity responsible directly to 
the COCOM or his deputy?  A cogent argument could be made for either answer, 
but certainly one choice would be preferable to the other. 
2) How would each functional component organize itself to interface with 
the TSCC?  Should the DIRSPACEFOR position remain, at a perhaps lower 
rank, and the other functional components develop an internal space cell to focus 
on their particular medium of operations?  This seems to be the direction in which 
the Army is moving, and is being proposed in the Navy as well.  How these 
proposed structures develop depends largely on the communication of their 
value added to those who will be asked to resource their creation. 
3) Is the JFC the only level at which a TSCC should exist?  The 
CENTCOM theater arrangement is somewhat unique, as the geographic theater 
is separated into sub-unified commands such as Combined Joint Task Force – 
Horn of Africa, Multi-National Corps Iraq, and Combined Forces Command 
Afghanistan.  Should there be a space coordination cell at each of these 
command levels which could interface with the TSCC? 
4) What is the trend of Space Support Requests being sent to the 
DIRSPACEFOR, and how would that be impacted by shifting to a TSCC model?  
The CENTCOM DIRSPACEFOR maintains a list of SSR’s on the SIPRnet; a list 
of Army SSE and ARSST sitreps is also available.  The comparison and analysis 
of these lists would provide insight into areas where the TSCC could make more 
impact, or ways for it to better support each functional component.  This analysis 
would be valuable in the near term as a method for gaining further insight into the 
three coordination constructs presented here, and selecting the best one. 
5) What are the baseline roles and responsibilities of the organization 
which executes Space Coordinating Authority?  Air Force doctrine is explicit 
about what the position executing SCA ought to do; joint doctrine has not yet 
reached that level of detail.  An analysis which takes a realistic view of the 
desired roles of the space coordinating authority would be of great value. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
Space capabilities are an inseparable part of modern military operations.  
The tension between global assets, centralized command and control, and 
theater requirements and coordination presents a challenge to the development 
of a common structure.  Such a development, though, is foundational to 
increased efficiency and effectiveness of resource-limited military operations.  
The next evolutionary step in this development is the elevation of the space 
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APPENDIX: SIGNIFICANT DEFINITIONS 
 The Appendix provides further detail on the definitions presented in 
Chapter II.  In some cases, the doctrinal definitions have been edited for length in 




1. Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC 
SPACE) 
In July 2006 Commander, U.S. Strategic Command disestablished JFCC 
SGS and established JFCC SPACE.  The following is an excerpt from the 
STRATCOM Implementation Directive outlining the roles and responsibilities of 
JFCC SPACE: 
JFCC SPACE CONCEPT:  As directed by Commander, 
USSTRATCOM, (CDRUSSTRATCOM) the CDR JFCC SPACE will 
serve as the single point of contact for military space operational 
matters to plan, task, direct, and execute space operations.  CDR 
JFCC SPACE will direct the continuous planning and execution of 
assigned space operations missions…In close coordination with the 
headquarters staff and JFCC GSI, JFCC SPACE will conduct 
space operational-level planning, integration, and coordination with 
other USSTRATCOM joint functional and service components, 
other Combatant Commanders [through their Space Coordinating 
Authority (SCA)], and other DoD, and when directed, non-DoD 
partners to ensure unity of effort in support of military, national 
security operations, and support to civil authorities. 
AUTHORITIES:  CDR USSTRATCOM will supervise the exercise 
of authorities delegated in this directive.  The CDR JFCC SPACE is 
assigned the following authorities: 
a. Coordinating Authority for planning and execution of space 
operations. 
b. Operational Control (OPCON) of designated space and missile 
warning forces, as directed by USSTRATCOM. 
c. Direct Liaison Authority (DIRLAUTH) between JFCC SPACE and 
other joint functional and service components, combatant 
commanders, and agencies while keeping headquarters informed.  
JFCC Commanders are encouraged, consistent with DoD rules and 
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regulations, to develop robust coordinating relationships, to include 
inter-agency and combined forces where required, to enhance 
operational mission effectiveness.95 
2. Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) 
 The AOC is the senior C2 element of the TACS and includes 
personnel and equipment of the necessary disciplines to ensure the 
effective conduct of air and space operations (e.g., 
communications, operations, intelligence, etc.). As the operations 
command center of the JFACC, it provides the capability to plan, 
task, execute, monitor, and assess the activities of assigned or 
attached forces. When the JFACC is designated as the AADC, 
ACA, and SCA, these functions are also performed through the 
AOC. The AOC monitors execution of air operations and directs 
changes as the situation dictates. As the focal point of the TACS, 
the AOC should have secure and redundant communications with 
operations, logistics, weather, and intelligence centers, higher and 
lateral headquarters, as well as subordinate units to preclude 
degradation in its ability to control air forces. 
AOC Organization 
The baseline AOC organization includes an AOC commander, five 
divisions (Strategy, Combat Plans, Combat Operations, ISR, and 
Air Mobility), and multiple support/specialty teams.  Each integrates 
numerous disciplines in a cross-functional team approach to 
planning and execution. Liaisons from other Service and functional 
components may also be present to represent the full range of joint 
air and space capabilities. The following provides a summary of the 
major elements of an AOC. 
- The AOC Commander is charged with effectively managing air 
and space operations and establishing the AOC battle rhythm. The 
AOC commander commands the AOC weapons system (but not 
AETF forces). 
- The Strategy Division concentrates on long-range planning of 
air, space, and information operations to achieve theater objectives 
by developing, refining, disseminating, and assessing progress 
toward achieving the JFACC air and space strategy.  
- The Combat Plans Division applies operational art to develop 
detailed execution plans for air and space operations.  
                                             
95 General James E. Cartwright, USMC, memorandum, 19 Jul 2006, Joint Functional 
Component Command for Space – Implementation Directive. 
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- The Combat Operations Division monitors and executes current 
operations. The Combat Operations Division is also the focal point 
for monitoring the execution of joint and combined operations, such 
as time sensitive targeting (TST), TMD, Joint Suppression of 
Enemy Air Defense (JSEAD) supported by theater forces, and Joint 
Air Attack Team (JAAT). 
- The ISR Division, in conjunction with the Strategy, Combat Plans, 
Combat Operations, and Air Mobility Divisions, plans and executes 
airborne ISR operations and provides combat ISR support to air 
and space planning, execution, and assessment activities.  
- The Air Mobility Division plans, coordinates, tasks, and 
executes the theater air mobility mission. Unlike the other AOC 
divisions, which work solely for the AOC commander, the AMD 
coordinates with the DIRMOBFOR-Air but must remain responsive 
to the tempo and timing of the AOC commander's operation. The 
DIRMOBFOR-Air is responsible for integrating the total air mobility 
effort for the JFACC and, in this capacity, coordinates with the AMD 
on behalf of the JFACC to execute the air mobility mission.96 
 
3. FALCONER Air Operations Center 
 To plan, execute, and assess air and space power, the US 
Air Force has developed a series of tailored air and space 
operations centers (AOCs) that can be networked to provide the full 
range of air and space power to a joint force. Because air and 
space forces are not monolithic in execution and force presentation 
-- some are organized regionally, others functionally -- the nature of 
AOCs has been tailored to better plan and execute this mix. The 
AOC weapon system (AN/USQ-163) is also known as the 
“Falconer.” It is the operations command center of the JFACC and 
provides the capability to plan, task, execute, monitor, and assess 
the activities of assigned or attached forces… Although the US Air 
Force provides the core manpower capability for the AOC, other 
Service component commands contributing air and space forces, 
as well as any coalition partners, may provide personnel in 
accordance with the magnitude of their force contribution. The AOC 
can perform a wide range of functions that can be tailored and 
scaled to a specific or changing mission and to the associated task 





                                            
96 Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organization. 63. 
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operations, the US Air Force would not necessarily provide all of 
the elements described in the following sections if the situation 
does not warrant them.97 
 
4. Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) 
 The JSpOC is the operational command and control (C2) 
center that provides Comander, JFCC SGS (CDR JFCC SGS), via 
the Commander, Joint Space Operations (CDRJSO), the capability 
to plan, task, direct, synchronize, and assess the activities of 
assigned and attached space forces (as well as those space forces 
made available for tasking)… CDR JFCC SGS executes OPCON of 
space forces via the JSpOC at Vandenberg AFB, CA. 
The primary functions of the JSpOC are to: 
1.2.2.1. Develop a global space operations strategy to meet 
CDRUSSTRATCOM objectives and guidance. 
1.2.2.2. Assist development of theater space operations strategy to 
meet geographic unified commander objectives and guidance 
through robust interaction with theater AOCs. 
1.2.2.3. Produce and disseminate the Joint Space Tasking Order 
(JSTO). 
1.2.2.4. Task and execute day-to-day space operations for 
assigned and attached space forces. 
1.2.2.5. Receive, assemble, analyze, filter and disseminate space-
related all-source intelligence and weather information to support 
air and space operations planning, execution and assessment. 
1.2.2.6. Conduct operational-level assessments to determine 
mission and overall space operations effectiveness as required by 
CDRUSSTRATCOM and other geographic unified combatant 






                                            
97 Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organization. 94. 
98 Air Force Operational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 2-3.4, Joint Space Operations 
Center (Draft), 20 Jan 2006:1. 
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5. Standing Joint Force Headquarters 
a. Joint Warfighting Center 
A full-time, joint C2 element that is part of the geographic CDR’s 
staff. The SJFHQ focuses on deliberate and crisis action planning 
and is a fully integrated participant in the GCC staff’s planning and 
operations activities. The SJFHQ exploits new organizational and 
operational concepts and technology to enhance the command’s 
peacetime planning efforts, accelerate the efficient formation of a 
JTF HQ, and facilitate crisis response by the joint force.99 
b. U.S. Forces Command Website 
The mission of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) is 
to provide the warfighter with a trained, standing core element to 
enable the joint task force commander to command and control 
joint and multinational assigned forces. 
SJFHQ core elements at combatant commands:  U.S. Joint 
Forces Command (USJFCOM) developed and tested a conceptual 
model and created standards and certification criteria for 
deployable SJFHQ core elements (SJFHQ-CE) at combatant 
commands. The command rigorously tested and refined the 
conceptual model through a series of major experiments and 
exercises. As a result, the Secretary of Defense directed combatant 
commanders establish SJFHQ core elements by 2005. 
How does it work? A SJFHQ-CE brings a group of 57 experts in 
command and control procedures together to help integrate air, 
land, maritime and information capabilities at a joint task force 
headquarters (JTF HQ). Once the new JTF HQ is fully functional 
and supported, the SJFHQ-CE can be withdrawn to reconstitute 
and prepare for its next assignment. 
When not operationally deployed, SJFHQ-CEs assist the service 
headquarters in training to become a joint task force headquarters. 
What are the employment options for a SJFHQ-CE?  Combatant 
commanders has three primary options for employing SJFHQ-CEs: 
• SJFHQ-CEs can serve as the nucleus or core of a JTF HQ staff, 
but are not manned to be a fully operational headquarters without 
broad augmentation. 
 
                                            
99 U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Pamphlet 3 – Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint 
Force Headquarters (SJFHQ),” 1.  http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/jwfcpam3.pdf.  
Accessed May 2006. 
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• SJFHQ-CEs can provide key augmentation personnel to JTF HQ 
and facilitate the rapid transition of a service component 
headquarters to a JTF. 
 
• Combatant command headquarters can retain a SJFHQ-CE. In 
this situation, the command forms a warfighting headquarters 
executing operations through subordinate JTFs or service 
components. 
Impacting future JTF HQs:  The SJFHQ-CE concept supports 
how we fight today yet is flexible enough to be shaped to support 
tomorrow’s fighting force. 
The SJFHQ-CE concept will enable JTFs of the future to: 
• Rapidly activate with trained and skilled personnel. 
• Plan and execute faster than the adversary. 
• Integrate with non-military elements of national power for 
crisis resolution.100 
6. Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR)  
Within an AETF, the DIRSPACEFOR serves as the senior space 
advisor to the JFACC.  The DIRSPACEFOR, a US Air Force space 
officer, coordinates, integrates, and staffs activities to tailor space 
support to the JFACC. In addition, when the JFACC is designated 
as SCA, the DIRSPACEFOR will work the day-to-day SCA 
activities on behalf of the JFACC. If the COMAFFOR is neither SCA 
nor the JFACC, the COMAFFOR should establish a space liaison 
to the JFACC through an ACCE. The DIRSPACEFOR is part of the 
JFACC’s special staff.  Whether a permanent member of the 
theater MAJCOM staff or provided to the theater by Air Force 
Space Command (AFSPC), the DIRSPACEFOR should be pre-
identified to allow that officer time to become familiar with that 
theater’s space requirements. The DIRSPACEFOR’s specific 
responsibilities include: 
• Provide senior space perspective for strategy and daily 
guidance development, target selection, force 
enhancement to terrestrial operations, and special 
technical operations 
• (STO) activities relating to space operations.                                             
100 U.S. Joint Force Command, “Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element,” 
http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_sjfhq.htm.  Accessed May 2006. 
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• Facilitate AFSPC, USSTRATCOM, and national support 
to the JFC. 
• Provide assistance to the JFACC in determining and 
achieving military space requirements. 
 
• Assist regional AOC staff in developing and staffing space 
related operational requirements and policy matters. 
• Recommend appropriate command relationships for 
space to the JFACC.101 
 
7. Army Space Support Team (ARSST) 
The ARSSTs are USASMDC assets from the Active Army, USAR 
and ARNG. ARSSTs rapidly deploy worldwide within 48 hours to 
augment corps and division space expertise, normally within the G3 
section, during exercises and contingency operations, including 
combat operations. Their primary support is at the operational and 
tactical levels. ARSSTs may be assigned to support other levels in 
Army or non-Army units. 
Capabilities 
C-1. The mission of the ARSST is to deploy worldwide to provide 
force enhanced space support during operations and exercises. 
The ARSST brings with it a comprehensive variety of capabilities 
and products. Some are organic capabilities, ranging from subject 
matter expertise to specific tools such as topographic map printers. 
The strength of the support team concept is in its forward presence, 
which gives a front-line awareness of Army warfighter needs and 
the ability to provide fast, tailored solutions. 
C-2. In coordination with the G3 space element, the ARSST 
provides tailored, task organized space resources to assist the 
supported command in the areas of SATCOM, PVT; environmental 
monitoring, ISR, missile warning, and other theater-tailored space 
information. Each team is trained and equipped to network using 
space information channels from many sources. 
C-3. ARSSTs provide space expertise. Team members have an in-
depth understanding of red, gray, and blue space orders of battle, 
the operational capabilities and threats imposed, and implications 
                                            
101 Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organization. 63. 
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for land force operations. The ARSST also assists the supported 
command in space control planning/understanding. When the 
supported command is a joint task force (JTF), the ARSST can be 
a conduit for planning and requesting the integration of Army space 
control capabilities in the operation. 
C-4. The ARSST facilitates joint, interagency, and multinational, as 
well as Army operations. ARSSTs assigned to the combined force 
land component commander (CFLCC) host Air Force, Navy, and 
Marine planners and space experts to improve multi-Service and 
joint operations. 
C-5. In coordination with the G3 space element and the G2, 
ARSSTs support the space contribution to the IPB process. In 
coordination with the G3 space element, the ARSST supports the 
space estimate process. The ARSST provides space operations 
assessments and information to the G2, G3, G6, and other staff 
sections as appropriate. They, in turn, provide final staff 
assessments and determine impacts on communications, 
operations, and intelligence. The ARSST members integrate space 
into operations through participation in the military decisionmaking 
process by developing the space operations annex and providing 
current space-related information. The ARSST synchronizes space 
support and threat information in the unit execution matrix.102 
 
8. Space Support Element (SSE) 
The future force tactical headquarters is designed to perform 
tactical and operational level missions. The tactical headquarters is 
ARFOR/JFLCC capable without augmentation, and serves, with 
augmentation, as the JTF headquarters. The tactical headquarters 
contains an SSE, nominally consisting of two FA 40 SOOs. In 
peacetime or garrison operations, these space experts form an 
SSE within the G3 current operations section. In an operational or 
tactical situation, the SOOs in the SSE are in the main command 
post and provide or coordinate space support for other command 
posts. Generally, during field operations, one SOO provides space 
insight for planning future operations while the other supports 
current operations. The senior officer may adjust this support ratio, 
depending on METT-TC. Because of the small size of the SSE, it 
may be augmented by an ARSST. 
E-1. The functions of the SSE at the main command post (CP) 
include the following: 
                                            
102 Field Manual 3-14: Space Support to Army Operations. C-1. 
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• Provide tactical and operational space planning and support to the 
tactical headquarters. 
• Advise on space force enhancement and space control mission 
areas. 
• Advise on availability and use of military/civil/commercial 
spacebased assets. 
• Advise regarding the capabilities, limitations, and status of missile 
warning systems. 
• Produce space support annex and space input to 
estimates/OPLANs/FRAGOs/warning orders. 
• Prepare the space estimate tab to the space support annex to the 
OPLAN (see appendix A). 
• Support preparation of space portion of IPB and space order of 
battle. 
• Participate in initial targeting process. 
• Advise regarding space support to IO. 
• Provide space support products and services. 
• Synchronize space operations and effects with TAC CP 1. 
• Recommend/coordinate for additional space support and force 
structure. 
• Coordinate with higher headquarters space element. 
E-2. The functions of the SSE at the TAC CP 1 include the 
following: 
• Provide 24/7 space support to the tactical headquarters. 
• Advise regarding space force enhancement mission area. 
• Advise regarding space control mission area. 
• Advise on BFT capabilities and limitations. 
• Advise on availability and use of military/civil/commercial 
spacebased assets. 
72 
• Advise on capabilities and limitations of threat and nonaligned 
spacebased assets. 
• Provide tactical space products and support to TAC CP 1, 
subordinate units of action (UAs), joint, multinational, and 
interagency forces. 
• Participate in the targeting process. 
• Provide PVT reliability data and navigation warfare advice, and 
coordinate GPS enhancement. 
• Integrate operational headquarters and Army space unit 
augmentees into tactical headquarters operations. 
• Assist coordinating SATCOM and ISR support. 
• Monitor status of missile warning systems. 
• Synchronize space operations and effects with the main CP. 
• In coordination with SWO, provide weather effects analysis for 
tactical space operations. 
• Develop and update the space portion of the COP.103 
B. CONCEPTS 
1. Coordinating Authority 
A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating 
specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more 
Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or 
more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has 
the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, 
but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event 
that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be 
referred to the appointing authority.  Coordinating authority is a 
consultation relationship, not an authority through which command 
may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to 
planning and similar activities than to operations. (This term and its 
definition modify the existing term and its definition and are 
approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)104 
 
                                            
103 Field Manual 3-14: Space Support to Army Operations. E-1. 
104 Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). GL-6. 
73 
2. Space Authority 
Commander, USSPACECOM will plan and organize day-to-day 
operations and publish mission-type orders for future execution by 
components. To facilitate unity of the theater/joint operations area 
(JOA) space effort, the supported combatant commander or a joint 
force commander (JFC) may designate a space authority. The 
space authority will coordinate space operations, integrate space 
capabilities, and have primary responsibility for in-theater joint 
space operations planning. The coordinating authority typically will 
be the joint force air component commander, joint force land 
component commander, or joint force maritime component 
commander. In this position, the space authority designated by the 
JFC will coordinate space support of established objectives and act 
on behalf of the combatant commander with primary responsibility 
in theater for joint space operations planning.105 
3. Space Coordinating Authority (SCA) 
Within a regional operation, the JFC should designate SCA to 
facilitate unity of effort with DOD-wide space operations and non-
DOD space capabilities. Although JFCs may retain authority at 
the JTF level, they should normally designate as SCA the 
component commander who provides the preponderance of 
military space capabilities, the requisite ability to command 
and control them, and the resident space expertise. In most 
cases, the JFACC provides these capabilities through the Air 
Force’s organic space C2 infrastructure. Responsibilities of SCA 
include: 
• Determine, deconflict, and prioritize military space 
requirements for the JTF. 
• Recommend appropriate command relationships for 
space to the JFC. 
• Help facilitate space target nomination. 
• Maintain space situational awareness. 
• Request space inputs from JTF staff and components 
during planning. 
• Ensure optimum interoperability of space assets with 
coalition forces. 
                                            
105 Joint Publication 3-14: Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. ix. 
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• Recommend JTF military space requirement priorities to 
JFC.106 
4. Joint Warfighting Space (JWS) 
Ultimately, the JWS concept is about ensuring that space/near-
space systems and capabilities emerge as an organic part of the 
joint task force conducting military operations in theater.  The 
concept aims to provide operationally responsive access to and the 
tactical exploitation of space/near-space.  The JWS concept is best 
characterized as a responsive, end-to-end networked set of 
space/near-space capabilities dedicated to the JFC and integrated 
with NSS systems.  The JWS concept calls for the deployment of 
expeditionary space forces that deliver responsive space 
capabilities to the JFC to achieve operational and tactical effects in 
support of assigned missions.  The three components that follow 
are central to the idea and success of the JWS concept. 
• Expeditionary Space Force.  There are several key 
elements of JWS, but the centerpiece or success 
mechanism of the concept is an expeditionary space force 
of people and organizations.  The tailored force of space 
professionals who design, develop, plan, employ and 
operate space capabilities are the essential component in 
achieving the JFC’s desired effects.  In any given 
situation, a whole JWS force package may be required or 
just a specific UTC.  These pre-planned packages provide 
the JFC the means to employ a tailored JWS capability as 
mission needs dictate.  The JWS organization will be 
trained and tailored to rapidly deploy under operational 
control or tactical control of the JFC to deliver responsive 
space capabilities and meet JFC needs.  As elements of 
the expeditionary space/near-space force deploy to 
theater, geographically separated from their parent space 
organization, they remain fully integrated with global, as 
well as theater organic space forces to completely exploit 
national and DoD space assets in support of the JFC.    
• Responsive and Tailored Space Systems/Capabilities.  
JWS relies on the continued use of existing space 
capabilities in order to deliver additional or new 
capabilities to a supported theater commander.  
Advanced technology development is a principle element 
of this feature of JWS that enables the development of 
key capabilities including: responsive, affordable space 
lift; on-orbit assets with theater-tailored payloads that are 
                                            
106 Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organization. 63. 
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operational without delay; near-space assets with 
tailorable payloads, launchable in or near the theater; 
machine-to-machine collaboration between space and air, 
ground and sea assets; dynamic tasking of space/near-
space systems; tactical control of payload and 
dissemination of data; on-demand payload/sensor 
capacities especially in the ISR, SATCOM and 
counterspace mission areas; and prompt global precision 
conventional strike 
• Integrated JWS Operations.  Integrated JWS operations 
are essential to speed, precision and responsiveness, all 
traits desired in support of full spectrum operations. JWS 
capabilities will be developed with the operational or 
tactical user in mind.  Fully integrated JWS operations 
must occur across three specific areas: global and theater 
space integration; integration of space with the other 
domains of air, land, sea and information; and the 
horizontal integration of JWS with other NSS systems.  
While global and theater dedicated space forces differ in 
their area of interest, global and theater integration is 
essential to assure real time planning, deconfliction and 
coordinated effects in execution. This level of integration 
will be facilitated since the expeditionary forces are 
assigned day-to-day under the global space 
component.107 
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